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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOUISE OLSEN, 
Pla~1ntiff and Respondent, 
-vs.-
PREFERRED RISK MUTUAL IN-
SURANCE COMPANY, an Iowa Cor-
poration, 
Defendant .and Appellant. 
ADMISSION OF FACTS 
The respondent agrees with the facts as stated by 
the appellant except in the following particulars: The 
following are facts established by the evidence. 
STATEMEN·T OF FACTS 
A. The plaintiff had driven her car to the west sid8 
of the street and out of the lanes of moving traffic at a 
place which would not impede any of the lanes of traffic 
in order to change her flat tire. (TR. 10, TR. 59) Officer 
Burkdoll, who came immediately after the accident and 
saw the actual location of her automobile was asked the 
following question: 
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"Q. 'Are you able to tell the jury, Officer Burkdoll, 
what the location of the Chevrolet automobile 
was, in regards to the moving lanes of traffic 
on the west half of Washington Boulevard~ 
A. It would not impede the moving lanes of 
traffic." ( TR. 61) 
Mr. Nuxoll had driven out of the eating place a few 
feet away from where plaintiff had stopped. He had 
stopped his car four to five feet to the rear of her car 
and honked; she walked back and briefly told Mr. Nuxoll 
that she had a flat tire. She then walked to the rear of 
her car, opened the trunk lid and bent over to remove the 
tools from the trunk. There was nothing to obstruct his 
view. She was clearly in sight and in front of his automo-
bile. Mr. Nuxoll then drove his car forward into plain-
tiff, pinning her between the two cars. J\{r. Nuxoll then 
backed up and drove forward again; striking her for the 
second time, then he backed up, drove out around her 
vehicle and away. (TR. 11 & 12) 
STATE1IENT OF POINTS 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN DIRECTING A VER-
DICT ON THE QUESTION OF LIABILITY. 
POINT TWO 
SINCE COUNHEL'S ARGUMENT TO THE JURY IS 
SUGGESTION AND NOT TESTIMONY, NO PREJUDI·CIAL 
ERROR RESULTED IN ALLOWING ·COUNSEL TO MAKE A 
MATHEMATICAL COMPUTATION OF GENERAL DAMAGES 
FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING. 
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POINT THREE 
SINCE THE MATTER OF COUNSEL'S ARGUMENT IS 
DISCRETIONARY WITH THE TRIAL COURT AND THAIT 
DISCRETION WAS NOT ABUSED IN THIS .CASE, NO PRE-
JUDICIAL ERROR RESULTED IN PERMI'TTING COUNSEL 
TO MOTIVATE THE JUROR'S REASONING PROCESSES BY 
ASKING WHAT THEY WOULD TAKE. 
ARGlTMENT 
POINT ONE 
THE COURT WAS CORRECT IN DIRECTING A VER-
DICT ON THE QUESTION OF LIABILITY. 
The Supreme Court has long held that notwithstand-
ing a question of contributory negligence is ordinarily 
one of fact, where undisputed facts lead reasonable minds 
to one conclusion, the Court must declare such conclusion 
as a matter of law. (See Maybee v. M,aybee, 11 Pac. 2d, 
973; Balle v. 81nith, 17 Pac. 2d 233.) 
May it be noted further that when the plaintiff went 
back to the Nuxoll automobile she was not there long. 
She only had a few seconds to see Nuxoll. She was there 
just long enough to tell him that she had a flat tire and 
that ~was the reason she was not moving, and then 
went back. She did not have a chance to see his actions. 
He stayed in the car while she notified him the reason 
she was stopped was because she had a flat tire. There 
\Hls not any extended conversation. She proceeded direct-
ly to open her trunk lid with her back to Mr. Nuxoll and 
leaned in for the tools. It was light with perfect visibility 
3 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for Nuxoll. He knew that she was there. Now the thing 
of particular significance is that at this time, even if the 
plaintiff were negligent, which the respondent certainly 
does not feel she was; yet assuming that she was -that 
this moment when the plaintiff is directly in front of Mr. 
Nuxoll's car standing in clear view of him, not facing 
him and leaning against her trunk, Mr. Nuxoll now en-
tirely controlled the situation. He knew where she was, 
he knew that if he drove forward he would strike her. 
His actions now entirely would determine whether there 
was an injury. Yet in spite of this, Mr. Nuxoll drove dir-
ectly into the plaintiff, backed off, and drove into her 
again. No reasonable mind could say that the sole proxi-
mate cause of the injury was not the negligence of Mr. 
Nuxoll. The Court was entirely correct in determining 
that no reasonable mind could feel that the plaintiff was 
guilty of negligence which was a proximate cause of the 
injury. (See the following cases:) 
Cederloff v. Whited, 169 Pac. 2d 777; 
HaJrt v. Kerr, 175 Pac. 2d 475; 
Toomers Estate v. U.P.R.R._, 239 Pac. 2d 163; 
Peterson v. N-ielsen, 343 Pac. 2d 731; 
McMurdiB v. Underwood, 346 Pac. 2d 711; 
Gvrdner v. Union Oil Company, 13 Pac. 2d 915; 
Crornpton v. Ogden ['nioll Rai-lroad Co., 235 Pac. 
2d 515; 
Cox v. Thompson, 254 Pac. 2d 1047; 
Paulos v. Market St·reet, 28 Pac. 2d 94; 
65 Corpus Ju,ris Secundum, pages 7±2, 743, 744; 
J( nuts on v. Oregon Short Line, 2 Pac. 2nd 102. 
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POINT TWO 
SINCE COUNSEL'S ARGUMENT TO THE JURY IS 
SUGGESTION AND NOT TESTIMONY, NO PREJUDI.CIAL 
ERROR RESULTED IN ALLOWING ·COUNSEL TO MAKE A 
MATHEMATICAL COMPUTATION OF GENERAL DAMAGES 
FOR PAIN AND SUFFERING. 
Counsel must be of as much aid to the jury as possible 
in assisting them in reaching their verdict. To ask a jury 
to proceed up a "blind alley in the dark" simply is not 
reasonable. The reasons that have been given approving 
the type of argument used in the instant case are: 
(1) It is necessary that the jury be guided 
by reasonable and practical considerations. 
(2) That the trier of the facts should not be 
required to determine the matter in the abstract 
and relegated to a blind guess. 
(3) The argument that the evidence fails to 
provide a foundation for per diem suggestion is 
unconvincing because the jury must, by that or 
some other reasoning process, estimate and allow 
an amount appropriately tailored to the particular 
evidence in the case as to pain and suffering or 
other such element of damages. 
( 4) That per diem suggestion of counsel 
does no more than present one method of reason-
ing which the trier of the fact may employ to aid 
him in making a reasonable and sane estimate. 
(5) That per diem arguments are not evi-
dence but are used only as illustration and sug-
gestion. 
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( 6) The claimed danger of such suggestion 
being mistaken for evidence is an exaggeration 
a_,nd if danger is present it canbe dispelled by the 
. c.Qurt's chftrge. 
· (7) Opposing counsel is equally free to sug-
gest his own amounts. · 
'These are the reasons· given by the ·court in Ratner 
v.· Arrington) (Dist. C of App. Florida, April9, 1959) 111 
So. ( 2) 82 after a skillful and competent analysis of the 
problem. _This decision is one of the most recent opinions 
on this problem .. The comment on this decision by the 
Editor-in-chief at 23 N acca Law Journal 257 is worth 
repeating here : 
"Chief Judge Carroll's analysis of the crucial 
issue, presently clamoring for resolution in many 
states, whether a trial judge has discretion to 
permit counsel with the aid of a chart or black-
board to suggest in summation to the jury a per 
diem or other mathematical formula for measur-
ing damages for pain and suffering, is customarily 
meticulous, straightforward, just and lucid. Chief 
.Judge Carrol's cogently "Titten extremely con-
vincing opinion is unreservedly recommended. to 
the personal injury bar as an extraordinarily skil-
ful abridgement of the best arguments which have 
been advanced on· both sides of the question of the 
propriety ·of a per diem ·formula for damages. 
The result i,s -an opinion law-yers will want to read, 
notjp.st respect. His patient and perceptive criti-
que of the utility of the mathematical formula in 
.. assessing damages for 'pain and suffering is a 
timely and telling corrective to the stultification 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of the flawed opposite holding in Botta v. Brunner 
which, by banning such per diem measurement and 
barring counsel from even comment upon the 
amount prayed for in the ad damnum clause went 
far to leave the jury wrapped in a Grand Banks 
fog." 
"Argument to jury which constitutes an ex-
ample in arithmetic to show jury how to compute 
damages has been held proper.'' 88 C.J.S. 378. 
Trial judges in the Federal system, sitting as triers 
of the fact, have been sustained in approaching the prob-
lem in this manner. In Imperial OilJ LimttYed (U.S. Ct. 
App. 6th Cir. June 5, 1956) 234 F (2) 4, the court sus-
tained a trial judges findings (sitting without a jury) in 
using the following approach: by the use of a mathe-
matical formula, involving a sliding scale of varient 
amounts per day and month, geared to gradations of 
pain. The circuit court observed that although novel, this 
was not an arbitrary or unreasonable approach to the 
problem presented and its application was so adjusted 
as to be consistent with the evidence and to reach a result 
which does not appear to us to be manifestly unjust. 
Several courts have met this problem since the de-
cision in Botta v. Brunner and have rejected the conclu-
sion reached in the Botta case. Per diem assessment of 
damages for pain and suffering makes more sense that 
the "by guess and by golly" method. Contt'nental Bus 
System} Inc. v. Toombs (Tex. Civ. App. 1959) 325 S.W. 
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(2) 153; Ratner v. Arrington (D.C. App. Florida 1959) 
111 S.o. (2) 82; Johnsonv·. Brown· (Nev. 1959) 345 P. (2) 
75~ ' 
There is no error in. permitting counsel to use a chart 
in his final argument to the jury. Miller Petroleum 
Transporters, Ltd~ v. Price (Miss 1959) 114 So. (2) 756. 
Several recent _cases approve with varying degrees 
of enthusiasm counsel's right, in arguing the issue of the 
amount of the damages to suggest the use of a per diem 
or other mathematical formula as an aid to an accurate 
estimate of the award for pain and suffering. Boutang , 
v. Twin City Motor: Bus Co. (1956 ~finn.) 80 NW (2) 
30; Flahetty v. Minneapolis & St. Louis R. Co. (1958 
Minn.) 87 NW (2) 633; Four County Electric Power 
Asso. v. Clardy, (1954 Miss.) 73 So (2) 144, 44 ALR (2) 
1191; Arnold v. El[J'-s (1957 :Miss.) 97 So. (2) 744; J.D. 
TVright & Son Truck Line v. Chandler, (Tex. Civ. App.) 
231 SW (2) 786; Ratner v. Arrington (D.C. App~ Florida 
1959) 111 So. ( 2) 82 ; and the recent western case of 
Johnson v. Brown (Nev.1959) 345 P (2) 754. 
Counsel's final statement on the subject removed any 
doubt that his statements were anything but suggestions: 
"I'm just asking you to consider what would 
be a r~as_onable . amount per day for what she's 
gone through. * * * Now if that's ridiculous then 
you set it up by any other n1eans that you know." 
(Tr.128) 
Counsel's arg~ment in the instant case does no more 
than present one method of reasoning to the jury and 
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the jury is free to use the n1ethod it wishes. The Su-
prenle Court of Nevada on October 29, 1959 has wholly 
rejected the Botta case. The decision in Johnson vs. 
Brown (Nev. 1959) 345 P(2) 754 is persuasive because 
of the similar practice in that state and our state 
of advising the jury of the amount of the prayer and 
instructing the jury that their verdict may not exceed 
that amount. In that case counsel for plaintiff sug-
gested lOc per minute or $144.00 (as defense counsel 
dvd in the case at bar) and the court observed at 345 
P(2) 759: 
''We feel therefore that the preferable rule in 
this state in view of our statute and the custom 
and practice prevalent thereunder is that whether, 
under the circumstances of the particular case, 
the arguments of counsel suggesting a mathemati-
cal basis for fixing damages for pain and suffer-
ing is an improper invasion of the rights of the 
jury is to be determined by the trial judge in 
the exercise of judicial discretion." 
It should be noted that defense counsel used the "per 
diem" and "per minute" argument in an effort to make 
plaintiff's claims appear to be ridiculous. 
POINT THREE 
SINCE THE MATTER OF COUNSEL'S ARGUMENT IS 
DISCRETIONARY WITH THE TRIAL COURT AND THA:T 
DISCRETION WAS NOT ABUSED IN THIS ~CASE, NO PRE-
JUDICIAL ERROR RESULTED IN PERMTTTING COUNSEL 
TO MOTIV A'TE THE JUROR'S REASONING PROCESSES BY 
ASKING WHAT THEY WOULD TAKE. 
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The trial judge should be left large discretion in 
permitting and restraining counsel's argument and his 
rulings should generally be deferred to an appeal because 
of his better position to know the meaning, construction 
and effect of argument. 9 Blashfield 432. 
The advocate should be allowed a wide latitude in 
argument. This well established rule is well expressed 
in the case of Tucker vs. Henniker, 41 N.H. 317. 
"The counsel represents and is a substitute 
for his client. The largest and most liberal free-
dom of speech is allowed and the law protects 
him in it. His illustrations may be as various as 
the resources of his genius; his argumentation 
as full and profound as his learning can make it." 
As stated at 88 C.J.S. 357-358: 
"Counsel is allowed much latitude in arguing. 
He may draw conclusions from the evidence on 
his own system of reasoning, although such in-
ferences as stated by counsel are inconclusive, 
improbable, illogical, erroneous, or even absurd." 
Lawyer vs. Stansell, 250 N.W. 887. 
Hayes vs. Coleman, 61 N.W. (2) 634. 
Seeley vs. Manhattan, 61 A. 585. 
Guest vs. Guest, 235 S.W. (2) 710. 
Seaboard Airline Ry. vs. Horning, 89 S.E. 493. 
The latitude which fairly and properly was extended 
to plaintiff's counsel in the present case was not an 
abuse of discretion on the part of the trial judge. 
10 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that no prejudicial error 
O('('nrred in the court below and that the judgment of the 
trial court should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DALE T. BROWNING and 
CALVIN GOULD 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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